The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Oil Pollution Act
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was the major spill caused when the crude tanker ran aground in Alaska on 24 March 1989.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was the major spill caused when the crude tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on the night of 24 March 1989. Eight cargo tanks ruptured and about 258,000 barrels, or 10.8 million gallons (41 million litres), of crude went into the water.[1][2] About 1,300 miles (2,100 km) of shoreline were affected. The volume would not put it near the top of any world list, but it led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and ended the single-hull tanker.[2]
1986-1989The Ship and the Voyage
Exxon Valdez was built for Exxon Shipping by National Steel in San Diego and delivered on 11 December 1986. She was a single-hull tanker of 214,861 DWT, 987 feet long, and the largest ship yet built on the US West Coast. Her normal complement was 19.[1]
She carried North Slope crude, brought to the Valdez terminal by the Trans-Alaska pipeline, down to California. She berthed at 23:35 on 22 March. Loading began at 05:05 the next day and ended at 19:24. This cargo was bound for Long Beach.[1][2]
23 March 1989The Day Ashore
Captain Joseph Hazelwood was 42. He had joined the company as a third mate in 1968, made master in 1980 and been through Prince William Sound well over a hundred times. He had been through alcohol rehabilitation and had drink-driving convictions from 1985 and 1988.[1]
On the morning of 23 March, with loading under way, he went ashore with the chief engineer and the radio officer. They passed the terminal gate at 10:59, did business at the agent's office, had lunch and later met at a bar in town. The two others told investigators that Hazelwood drank there. Around 19:00 they ordered pizza and by their account had another drink each next door while it was made. The cab reached the terminal gate at 20:24. The driver and the security officers said nobody seemed drunk.[1]
Third Mate Gregory Cousins spent the day on board. During cargo work he and the second mate were standing roughly six hours on and six off. He had gone to sleep at 01:00, been called at 07:20 and napped from 13:00 to 13:50. The pumpman who spoke to him just before he went back to the bridge said he looked tired.[1]
24 March 1989The Night on Bligh Reef
The last line came off at 21:12 and she sailed with about 1,263,000 barrels, a state pilot conning. Hazelwood left the bridge 15 to 20 minutes later. She went through Valdez Narrows at 6 knots, and as she neared the pilot station off Rocky Point he was called back. The pilot left at 23:24.[1]
At 23:25 Hazelwood told the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Center that he was working up to 16 knots. Ice from the Columbia Glacier lay in the outbound lane and showed on radar. He said he would leave the traffic lane and might end up in the inbound lane, and the centre replied that no other traffic was reported. At 23:31 he came to 200 degrees and at 23:39 to 180, a heading out of the lanes and towards Bligh Reef. Once she was steady the helmsman put her on automatic pilot, and the engine was slowly brought up to sea speed.[1]
Hazelwood left the bridge at 23:52, saying he had messages to send. He told Cousins to start back to the lanes when Busby Island Light was abeam to port. Exxon's own rules called for the master or chief mate on the bridge in those conditions, and Cousins had no pilotage endorsement for these waters. His watch should have ended at 23:50, but he did not call Second Mate Lloyd LeCain and decided to stay until they were clear of the ice. Robert Kagan took the helm. By Cousins's account he learned about the automatic pilot at this point and put her in hand steering.[1][2]
At 23:55 Cousins took a bearing of Busby Island Light and went to the chart room to plot it. The lookout, on the starboard wing, saw a red light flashing every 5 seconds on the starboard bow and came in to report it. It was the Bligh Reef buoy, and on the right track it should not have been on that side. Cousins acknowledged her calmly, having already seen the buoy on radar.[1][2]
About a minute later he ordered 10 degrees of right rudder, did not check the rudder indicator and phoned Hazelwood to say he had started the turn. The call lasted about a minute and a half, with his back to the indicator. Back at the radar he saw that the heading had not changed. The lookout returned to say the light was now flashing every 4 seconds. Cousins ordered 20 degrees and then hard right. By his account the stern was still in the white sector of Busby Light. The NTSB concluded that she had been in the red sector, the one warning of the reef, for several minutes, and that neither he nor the lookout noticed. He phoned again and told Hazelwood, "I think we are in serious trouble."[1]
As the call ended she touched bottom. Forty to fifty seconds later came about ten seconds of sharp jolts, and Cousins ordered hard left to keep the stern from swinging onto the rocks. The ship's log says 00:04 and Cousins said 00:05. From the course recorder trace, the NTSB settled on about 00:09.[1]
The First Hours Aground
Chief Mate James Kunkel ran to the cargo control room. The centre and starboard cargo tanks were emptying fast and empty ballast tanks were filling. Shortly before 00:30 he told Hazelwood that about 115,000 barrels had gone. His computer run showed stability adequate but hull stress over the limit, and he recommended that she not be moved.[1]
At 00:27 Hazelwood reported to the traffic centre that she was aground and leaking oil. The Coast Guard closed the port at about 00:30. At 00:35 Hazelwood restarted the engine and tried to work her off. When the Captain of the Port called at 01:07 he said "we are working our way off the reef" and was told to take it slow and easy. The engine stopped at 01:41. She was still on the reef when Coast Guard officers boarded at 03:35, and he told them about 138,000 barrels had been lost.[1]
The response plan belonged to Alyeska, the pipeline consortium that ran the terminal. For a 200,000-barrel spill it allowed five hours for the response barge to reach the scene. The barge had been stripped after a January job, damaged in a February storm and had to be loaded. It left at 11:37 and arrived at 14:30, over 14 hours after the grounding.[1] A helicopter that took off at 07:27 saw a slick 4 to 5 miles long. Exxon Baton Rouge, called in to take off the remaining cargo, came alongside at 20:10 and lightering began on the morning of 25 March.[1]
Dispersant was another problem. A helicopter application on the first day missed its target. Exxon later claimed that Alaska delayed approval until the night of 26 March, which the state denied. After about three days of calm a storm drove the oil onto the beaches of Knight Island.[2]
After 1989The Cleanup and Life in the Sound
More than 11,000 Alaskans worked on the cleanup. Oil reached 1,300 miles of shore, of which 200 miles were heavily or moderately oiled. Hot high-pressure washing killed shoreline life as well, and only about 10% of the oil was recovered. Exxon spent about $1.85 billion on cleanup in 1989 alone, against a calculated value of $3.4 million for the lost cargo.[1][2]
The cleanup cost about $1.85 billion in 1989 alone. The lost cargo was worth $3.4 million.
The first losses were put at 100,000 to 250,000 seabirds, at least 2,800 sea otters, about 300 harbour seals, 247 bald eagles and 22 orcas.[2] Fisheries closed. The herring stock collapsed in 1993 and did not return.[3] A 2001 survey cited by NOAA found oil beneath the beach surface over about 7.8 hectares, and an updated model put the remainder at 0.6% of the spill, with decades needed for much change.[4] The AT1 orca group numbered 22 in 1984 and eight or nine in 2004, and it was not producing calves.[5]
1990The NTSB Report and Responsibility
A blood sample was taken from Hazelwood at 10:50, more than ten hours after the grounding, and showed 0.061% alcohol. Tests on the third mate, helmsman and lookout were clean.[1] Exxon fired him and public opinion blamed him. The National Transportation Safety Board's 1990 report named five probable causes. The third mate failed to manoeuvre properly because of fatigue and excessive workload. The master failed to provide a proper watch because of impairment from alcohol. Exxon failed to provide a fit master and a rested, sufficient crew. The Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service was ineffective. Pilotage services were inadequate.[1]
The findings added that Exxon had manipulated overtime reports, had not monitored the master after his rehabilitation and had no rested deck officer available for the departure. The Board thought leaving the lanes to avoid ice probably reasonable, and leaving the third mate in charge improper.[1]
1990-2009The Courts
Hazelwood stood trial in Anchorage in 1990. Twenty-one witnesses said he had not seemed drunk. The jury cleared him of the three serious charges and convicted him of negligent discharge of oil, for which he got a $50,000 fine and 1,000 hours of community service. He apologised to Alaskans in 2009 and died on 21 July 2022, aged 75.[2][6]
In 1991 Exxon settled with the federal government and Alaska for a $150 million fine (with $125 million remitted for cooperation), $100 million in restitution and a $900 million civil settlement paid over eleven instalments.[3] The fishermen's case took far longer. An Anchorage jury awarded $287 million in actual damages and $5 billion in punitive damages in 1994. The appeal court cut that to $2.5 billion. On 25 June 2008 the Supreme Court limited punitive damages to a one-to-one ratio with actual damages, which brought them to $507.5 million. Exxon finished paying in December 2009, by which time some claimants had died.[2][7]
1990OPA 90 and the Double Hull
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act in August 1990. It required financial responsibility and response plans, made double hulls compulsory for new tankers entering US waters and set 1 January 2015 as the end date for single hulls.[2][8] A Coast Guard study estimated that a double hull would have cut the Exxon Valdez spill by 60%.[2] One clause barred ships that had spilled more than a million gallons after 22 March 1989 from Prince William Sound. Exxon challenged it and lost in a federal appeal court in 2002.[2]
The rest of the world went the same way. IMO amended MARPOL in 1992 to require double hulls on new tankers, and P&I clubs repriced US risk. Rest hours and manning later became matters for port state control. The financial responsibility rule is not limited to tankers. Cargo ships over 300 GT entering US waters also have to document cover for the marine fuel in their tanks.
2012What Became of the Ship
The tanker was towed to San Diego on 10 July 1989. Repairs replaced 1,600 short tons of steel, cost $30 million and returned her to sea as Exxon Mediterranean in June 1990. OPA 90 kept her out of Alaska. She changed name several more times and was run ashore and scrapped at Alang in India in August 2012.[2]
Frequently asked questions
What was the Exxon Valdez oil spill?
The major spill caused when the crude tanker ran aground in Alaska on 24 March 1989.
Where was the captain when Exxon Valdez grounded?
In his quarters. Joseph Hazelwood had left the bridge at 23:52 and Third Mate Gregory Cousins had the watch. Cousins was on the phone to him as she struck.
How much oil did Exxon Valdez spill?
About 258,000 barrels, or 10.8 million gallons. She was carrying 1.26 million barrels, so about a fifth of the cargo was lost.
Sources
- National Transportation Safety Board. Grounding of the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef, NTSB/MAR-90/04, 1990.
- Wikipedia. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.
- Chugach Regional Resources Commission. Exxon Valdez.
- NOAA Fisheries. Lingering Oil from the Exxon Valdez Spill.
- Reuters. Alaska Orca Pod to Get Special Protection, NBC News, 4 June 2004.
- Exxon Valdez Capt. Joseph Hazelwood Dies at 75, Associated Press, September 2022.
- NPR. Supreme Court Cuts Damages in Exxon Valdez Spill, 25 June 2008.
- gCaptain. Final Farewell to Single Hull Oil Tankers.